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WORKER RIGHTS CONSORTIUM ASSESSMENT OF PT KOLON LANGGENG, 





PT Kolon Langgeng is a factory in Jakarta, Indonesia that has manufactured 
skirts, pants, jackets and shirts bearing college and university logos for Nike, through 
Nike’s broker Boolim.  Located in the Cakung branch of the export processing zone 
Kawasan Berikat Nusantara (KBN), PT Kolon Langgeng employs between 800 and 900 
employees.  The number of employees fluctuates depending on orders at the factory: 
during times when orders are high, additional employees are brought in on short-term 
contracts.  PT Kolon Langgeng is owned by Kolon International Corporation, a company 
based in Seoul, South Korea. 
In November 2002, the WRC received a complaint from workers at PT Kolon 
Langgeng, including allegations that, if valid, would constitute violations of Indonesian 
law and of college and university codes of conduct primarily in the realm of wages and 
benefits, forced and uncompensated overtime, and occupational health and safety.  After 
preliminary confirmation of the elements of the complaint, the WRC sent a letter to the 
president of the company on November 26, 2002, presenting a summary of the 
allegations and informing the factory that the WRC was considering whether to initiate a 
full investigation.  The WRC did not receive any reply to this communication. 
Preliminary research indicated that there was sufficient evidence of code of 
conduct violations to warrant a full assessment of PT Kolon Langgeng and, in February 
2003, the WRC undertook this assessment.  The WRC’s Assessment Team, composed 
primarily of prominent Jakarta-based labor lawyers, labor rights professionals and experts 
in occupational health and safety, carried out its official investigation from February 21-
27, 2003.  This report documents the outcome of that process, as well as of the 
supplementary research conducted subsequently by WRC staff and partner organizations. 
 This assessment was carried out in the same time frame as the WRC’s assessment 
of PT Dae Joo Leports, a factory also located in the KBN export processing zone.  This 
timing was chosen both because concerns about the two factories arose concurrently and 
because the WRC had identified a need to examine potentially widespread code of 
conduct problems in the KBN zone. 
The WRC is pleased to report that, in response to the findings of code of conduct 
violations outlined below, there has been some substantial progress at PT Kolon 
Langgeng, especially in the areas of freedom of association, legally mandated health 
benefits and the reinstatement of unlawfully terminated workers.  It is also important to 
note that the evidence identified by the Assessment Team failed to substantiate some of 
the allegations made in the worker complaint.  In the WRC’s view, the efforts of Nike, 
and Nike’s South Korea-based broker Boolim, have been central in persuading 
management to initiate some of the changes necessary to bring the facility into 
compliance with college and university codes of conduct.  At the same time, there are 
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still several serious code of conduct violations at PT Kolon Langgeng that management 
has not addressed and others where remediation has been promised but not yet achieved.  
The WRC will review the situation at the factory again this fall.  The degree of progress 
on these unresolved issues will be the key indicator of the success of remediation efforts 
at this facility.  This report addresses and analyses these unresolved issues as well as the 
areas where remediation is substantially complete.  
  
 
Sources of Evidence 
  
 During the course of the assessment, the WRC team gathered evidence from the 
following sources:  
• Interviews with 34 current employees from the sewing, cutting, quality control, 
mechanics and packing divisions; seven recently terminated employees; and the 
family of a worker who died in January 2003. The employees (and former 
employees) whose experiences are reflected in the analysis below ranged in age 
from 20 to 32 years, and had put in between two and seven years of service at the 
factory at the time of the interviews. 
• Interviews with upper- and mid-level management, including the President 
Director of the factory and the Assistant Manager of the Casual and Sportswear 
Team of Kolon International in Seoul, and a survey of the factory premises. 
• Collection and review of company documents including letters of resignation, 
settlement agreements between management and terminated employees, health 
insurance records, payroll records, the collective bargaining agreement in place at 
the time of the investigation, and public notices issued by the company. 
• Interviews with doctors and managers at the KBN zone health clinic used by 
workers at PT Kolon Langgeng. 
• An interview with the Administration of the KBN export processing zone. 
• Interviews with regional Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia (All Indonesian 
Workers Union; henceforth “SPSI”) leaders. 
• Interviews with Serikat Pekerja Tekstil, Sandang dan Kulit (Indonesian Textile, 
Garment, and Leather Workers Union; henceforth “SPTSK”) national, regional, 
and factory level officers, and factory level members.  
• Interviews with Gambungan Serikat Buruh Independen (Association of 
Independent Unions; henceforth “GSBI”) factory–level members and officers, as 
well as national officers. 
• Interviews with regional organizers from Serikat Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia 
(Indonesian Workers Welfare Union; henceforth “SBSI”).  
• Interviews with government officials from the Panitia Penyelesaian Perselisihan 
Perburuhan Daerah (Regional Committee for the Settlement of Labor Disputes; 
henceforth “P4D”). 
• Interviews with government officials from the Departmen Tenaga Kerja dan 
Transmigrasi (the Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration; henceforth 
“Depnakertrans” and the provincial branch, “Disnaker”). 
• Interviews with officials from PT Jaminan Sosial Tenaga Kerja (a government-
operated social security firm; henceforth “JAMSOSTEK”). 
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• A follow-up assessment of occupational health and safety standards at PT Kolon 
Langgeng led by the WRC in collaboration with Higiene Perusahaan Kesehatan 
dan Keselamatan Kerja (the Indonesian governmental agency for workplace 
health and safety; henceforth “HIPERKES”). 
• Extensive research of Indonesian law, including governmental and departmental 
regulations, guidelines and circulars.  
  
 
 Allegations Assessed in this Report 
  
Based on the worker complaint and preliminary research by WRC staff and consultants, 
including extensive worker interviews, a number of potential violations of law and of 
codes of conduct were identified for investigation by the WRC Assessment Team. The 
concerns and allegations were as follows: 
• Freedom of Association & Collective Bargaining. That the union at the factory 
existed only on paper, and only for the purpose of ratifying management’s 
policies. It was also alleged that management placed restrictions on the operation 
of other unions. 
• Arbitrary Firings and Forced Resignations. That terminations of workers were 
carried out in an arbitrary, discriminatory and legally deficient manner. 
• Religious and Gender Discrimination.  That the company discriminated against 
women wearing hijab (a head covering worn by some observant Muslim women) 
and against men in the hiring process. 
• Psychological and Physical Abuse. The WRC investigated allegations that some 
supervisors subjected workers to abusive forms of discipline. 
• Access to Health Care. That there was an absence of legally mandated health 
insurance. 
• Occupational Health and Safety. That the factory failed to provide appropriate 
personal safety equipment. 
• Failure to provide essential work equipment. That employees often felt compelled 
to purchase their own work tools without compensation from the company. 
• Forced Overtime/Overtime Compensation. That workers had no option to refuse 
overtime and that overtime was improperly compensated. 
• Tax Forms. That employees were required, annually, to fill out and pay for the 
notarization of forms containing information about their marital status and 
dependents, ostensibly in order for them to receive tax deductions, and that 
workers never received these deductions. 
• Access to Leave. That the factory denied or restricted access to annual leave, sick 
leave and menstrual leave. 
• Mandatory Wage Deductions.  That the company deducted money from workers’ 
wages in exchange for food and transport benefits, without workers’ consent. 
• Water Quality. That the drinking water available at the factory was dirty and 
undrinkable on a regular basis.  
• Body Searches. That workers were subjected to body searches that were 
unnecessarily intrusive, with certain individuals being singled out for particularly 
degrading treatment. 
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The WRC’s findings with respect to each of these areas of potential non-
compliance are outlined below.  Also outlined, where appropriate, are recommendations 
for remedial action, developed in consultation with workers, government agencies and 
experts in the field.  As noted above, substantial remediation work has occurred at PT 
Kolon Langgeng over the months since the WRC Assessment Team’s initial on-site 
investigation. This progress has taken place in the context of extensive and ongoing 
discussions among the WRC, the licensee, the licensee’s broker and factory management. 
The status of these discussions and progress on remediation efforts to date are reviewed 
below. 
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FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND STATUS REPORT 
  
  
Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining 
  
Allegations 
The Assessment Team investigated allegations that the union, SPSI, at PT Kolon 
Langgeng was not a legally constituted union and did not, in name or in action, represent 
the employees of the factory.  Workers also alleged that management refused to allow the 
operation of other unions. 
  
Findings 
The Assessment Team concluded that there were significant violations of 
Indonesian law and college and university code of conduct provisions in the realm of 
freedom of association and collective bargaining.  
The Assessment Team confirmed that the membership of the SPSI union at PT 
Kolon Langgeng consisted of a single employee – the warehouse manager – who was 
cited by management as the legitimate representative of the workforce. However, SPSI 
officials interviewed at the regional and national level assert that this individual has not 
been a member, or even involved in union activities, for several years. Nevertheless, 
factory management referred to him as the “chairman” of the union and the official 
representative of all factory employees. This employee was also the only signatory, on 
behalf of labor, to the Kesepakatan Kerja Bersama (collective bargaining agreement; 
henceforth “KKB”) in force in the factory at the time of the WRC assessment.1  In 
interviews with the Assessment Team, most workers indicated that they were unaware of 
the existence of any union whatsoever in the factory. Those who had heard of the union 
described it as ineffectual and/or as being in collusion with management.  This false 
representation of workers violated Indonesian law protecting workers’ associational 
rights from management interference.2 
The Assessment Team reviewed a copy of the KKB provided by PT Kolon 
Langgeng management.  The document further supported the conclusion that the SPSI 
union at the factory did not represent workers and that the “chairman” of SPSI had no 
authority to sign the agreement.  No employee negotiation team was mentioned in the 
contract, nor were there any signatures of workers and/or union representatives other than 
that of the aforementioned chairman.3 There was no attached statement from workers, 
granting the union “chairman” the authority to represent them in negotiations.4 The KKB 
also failed to mention any details regarding the union’s registration with Disnaker.  
Moreover, none of the workers interviewed by the Assessment Team had, according to 
                                                 
1 KKB, PT Kolon Langgeng, Jakarta July 3, 2001 
Note: Indonesian laws and regulations fall into four general categories: Peraturan Menteri (Ministerial 
Regulations; henceforth “PER-/MEN/”), Keputusan Menteri (Ministerial Decrees; henceforth “KEP-/ 
MEN/”), Undang-Undang (Acts or Ordinances; henceforth “UU”), and Peraturan Pemerintah (Government 
Regulations; henceforth “PER-/MEN/”) 
2 UU-21/2000 
3 See PER-01/MEN/1985 Chapter VII (Articles 1, 9) 
4 See PER-49/PEM/1954, Article 3 
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their testimony, ever seen a copy of the KKB, or had its contents explained to them either 
by management or by the union “chairman.” 
In addition to the illegal manner through which it was negotiated, the contents of 
the contract were legally deficient, in several areas.  For example, the factory created a 
list of “serious mistakes” for which employees could be terminated; this is impermissible, 
because valid reasons for termination are defined by government regulations and cannot 
be altered by private contract (see the case of Hermanto and Supriyanto below for 
details). According to law, a KKB with “regulations contrary to the law… shall be 
considered null and void.”5  As an official from Disnaker told the Assessment Team, 
workers in Indonesia cannot sign away basic legal protections such as those regulating 
dismissal. 
The KKB was routinely relied upon by management – for example, when 
justifying the termination or disciplining of workers (see the section concerning alleged 
arbitrary dismissals).  Indeed, management told the Assessment Team that it considered 
the contract to be legally valid and in force. 
During a meeting with the Assessment Team on February 24, management 
asserted that the KKB was in compliance with the law – regardless of any defects in its 
contents or the negotiation process – on the grounds that the document bore the official 
stamp of Disnaker.  However, the position of Disnaker, as noted by government officials 
to the Assessment Team, is that Disnaker’s current process of approving KKBs does not 
include a procedure to determine whether the contents of the contract meet the 
requirements of law (a new system is planned, but will not go into effect for several 
years). Thus, a Disnaker stamp cannot be taken as proof that the contents of a KKB are 
legally acceptable. 
In addition to using the SPSI “chairman” to lend the semblance of legitimacy to 
this invalid KKB, management also routinely invited him to play a central role in the 
settlement of labor disputes in the factory.  According to testimony received by the 
Assessment Team, he consistently urged workers (or their family members) to accept 
compensation (for example, severance) significantly lower than that to which they were 
entitled under law. 
The WRC also found that workers’ requests to involve other unions in dispute 
resolution were rejected by management.  For example, during a strike that occurred in 
June 2002, workers informed management that they wished to be represented in 
negotiations by the local office of SBSI. A government official from Disnaker notified 
management that SBSI had standing to play such a role. Nonetheless, management 
refused to negotiate with SBSI, despite its legal obligation to negotiate with the workers’ 
chosen representative.   
Based on the evidence outlined above, the WRC concluded that PT Kolon 
Langgeng was in violation of Indonesian law and university codes of conduct governing 
freedom of association and, specifically, that the existing KKB was illegal and could not 
be used as a basis for management policy or practice. 
  
Recommendations 
On April 1, the WRC submitted an outline of findings and a list of recommended 
remedial actions to PT Kolon Langgeng management and to Nike and its broker Boolim. 
                                                 
5 UU-13/2003 Article 124 (2) and (3) 
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With respect to freedom of association, WRC recommended that the management 
acknowledge that the KKB did not have legal validity and cease using the contract as a 
basis for policy and practice and for determining the respective rights and obligations of 
workers and management. 
 The WRC further recommended that the company post a written, public statement 
that all unions were allowed access to PT Kolon Langgeng, and that workers were free to 
affiliate with any union of their choice without fear of reprisal. The WRC further 
recommended that management reinforce this announcement by communicating its 
contents to all supervisors, line leaders, personnel staff, factory security, and all other 
staff who might influence whether, and to what extent, workers exercised this right.   
The WRC felt this step was of substantial importance because workers cannot 
exercise their associational rights freely if they have reason to believe this will result in a 
coercive response by management.  By imposing an unlawful KKB on the workforce 
through the mechanism of a sham union, and by summarily dismissing outspoken leaders 
among the workforce (a practice documented in the following section of this report), PT 
Kolon Langgeng management produced a chilling effect that required not just a cessation 
of past practices but an active effort to make clear that the factory intended to respect 
workers’ rights in the future.  
  
Response from PT Kolon Langgeng and the Licensee and Status of Remediation 
 Subsequent to receiving the WRC’s communication of April 1, PT Kolon 
Langgeng management did shift away from their initial insistence that the KKB was 
legally valid.  However, while this was a positive step, management did not set out 
clearly how they intended to change their practices.   
Management had not posted any announcement regarding freedom of association 
by the end of May.  Management did post a new non-discrimination policy, dated April 
21, 2003, which pledged no discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, skin color, gender, 
origin, age, religion and marital status; however, the policy omitted any reference to 
union affiliation or political belief.   
 However, there were some indications of progress. The KKB was due to expire at 
the beginning of July and management informed the WRC that they understood that if a 
new KKB was to be renegotiated, it would have to be with a legitimate, lawfully 
constituted union.  Also, it is worthy of note that, several weeks after the assessment, on 
April 16, 2003, approximately 20 workers at PT Kolon Langgeng felt hopeful enough 
about changes in management’s perspective on associational rights to register as a 
factory-level union with Disnaker, affiliated with GSBI.  
Nike agreed from the outset that based on the evidence the KKB was invalid and 
should not have standing.  The WRC believes that the prompt intervention of Nike and its 
broker Boolim played a considerable role in moving management to reconsider its stance 
on this issue. 
  
New Developments 
 Unfortunately, beginning in May, management chose to resolve the problem of its 
illegitimate KKB by seeking to organize a company union.  This process began with 
management identifying two workers from each production line to serve as worker 
representatives.  The effort escalated, with management assembling these favored 
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workers as a group, urging them to form a union, and supplying them the use of company 
meeting space and equipment, while denying these same privileges to the newly formed 
GSBI union.  This group of workers, many of whom were supervisor and office 
employees, then formed and registered a union, affiliated with SPTSK.  On June 11, 
during work hours, SPTSK was granted the run of the factory to distribute membership 
forms and recruit members – with SPTSK representatives, primarily supervisors, telling 
workers that management expected them to join.  (When GSBI members subsequently 
tried to distribute literature inside the factory, they were stopped by managers.)   In this 
coercive environment, a significant number of workers, though not a majority, signed 
SPTSK membership forms in the week after June 11.  During this time, management 
began holding formal meetings with SPTSK to discuss workplace issues, while refusing 
to meet with GSBI.   
Responding to allegations from workers about these activities, WRC staff 
investigated, interviewing workers, management and union leaders and reviewing 
relevant documents, including a sign-in sheet from the meeting where the SPTSK union 
was formed, which listed a senior manager of the factory as a participant.  The evidence 
strongly supported the conclusion that management was acting in violation of law and 
applicable codes of conduct. 
 The WRC expressed its concern to PT Kolon Langgeng management and, on June 
18, communicated with Nike and urged action to compel management to cease these 
activities and take remedial action.   It was particularly disturbing that these activities 
were taking place at a time when the factory was under special scrutiny from Nike and 
Boolim as well as the WRC.  The WRC recommended a number of remedial steps to the 
factory management and urged Nike and Boolim to insist that management undertake 
these steps.  These included:  
 
• Considering SPTSK membership forms signed on or after June 11 to be void, 
given the coercive circumstances under which they were obtained, and not 
seeking to use these memberships to justify negotiating with SPTSK as a 
representative union. 
 
• Posting notices throughout the factory informing workers of their right to join any 
union of their choice (or no union) and stating that management would neither 
reward nor punish any worker for the choice they made; requiring every line 
and/or department supervisor to read this statement out loud to the employees 
under his or her authority. 
 
• Holding a joint meeting with both unions to work out fair and mutually agreeable 
ground rules for access to the factory for union business; and refraining from 
holding any further discussions about workplace issues except with the 






Worker Rights Consortium  Page 9 10/8/2003 
These recommendations led to a meeting at the factory, on June 20, involving 
factory management and representatives of the WRC and Nike.  At this meeting, 
management agreed to take the recommended remedial action as well as additional steps 
that were suggested during the discussion.  PT Kolon Langgeng management: 
 
• Agreed to discount all SPTSK membership forms, except those belonging to the 
group of ten individuals who had initially registered the union with the Ministry 
of Manpower. 
 
• Produced, in consultation with both unions and the WRC, an appropriate 
statement pledging to respect workers associational rights, posted this statement, 
and, on June 21, required supervisors to read the statement aloud. 
 
• Instructed all supervisors and administrative staff that they were obligated to 
refrain from any coercive action with respect to workers’ choices about union 
representation.   
 
• Agreed that the two unions should meet and decide on ground rules for union 
activities inside the workplace.  This meeting took place on June 23.  
Management decided not to attend the meeting, but agreed to accept, and did 
accept, the ground rules decided on by the unions.  This included the 
identification of a workday where both unions would be able to distribute 
membership forms to all members of the workforce and workers could use this as 
an opportunity to join the union of their choice or refrain from joining any union. 
 
• Agreed to invite representatives from both GSBI and SPTSK to any further 
meetings concerning workplace issues. 
  
All of these commitments were fulfilled.  These very significant steps constituted 
substantial remediation of violations of workers’ associational rights and of the chilling 
effect of these violations.   
The free and lawful contest for union membership facilitated by the ground rules 
agreement among the unions and the factory led to a successful effort by GSBI to recruit 
a majority of the workforce.  As the majority union, GSBI recently submitted to 
management a collective contract proposal and requested that negotiations begin.  It is the 
WRC’s understanding that management is currently discussing a timetable for 
negotiations with GSBI. 
If PT Kolon Langgeng proceeds with contract negotiations as the law requires and 
refrains from further favoritism or other violations of associational rights, remediation 
should be considered complete in this area.  In the view of the Assessment Team, 
intervention by Nike and its broker, particularly during the meeting of June 20, played a 
central role in achieving this result. 
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Arbitrary Firings and Forced Resignations 
  
Allegations 
The Assessment Team examined allegations that termination of employment 
frequently took place in ways that contravened provisions of Indonesian law designed to 
protect workers from arbitrary and retaliatory dismissals.   
  
Findings 
Based on review of relevant materials from personnel files and extensive worker 
interviews, the Assessment Team identified a clear pattern of disregard by factory 
management of the laws mandating progressive discipline and due process prior to the 
termination of employees, the law protecting employees from dismissal for minor 
infractions, and the laws concerning severance.  In addition, the Assessment Team 
concluded that management regularly used coercive means to compel workers to resign, 
thus relinquishing the rights granted under these laws.  In some cases, the Team 
concluded, management used arbitrary dismissals as a means to get rid of workers who 
were outspoken about workplace issues. 
The Team found that dismissals at PT Kolon Langgeng were, characteristically, 
not preceded by even one of the three warning letters that an employee must receive 
before being fired, according to Indonesian law (when there is not a gross violation).6  
The Assessment Team found that management would typically rely on a clause in the 
KKB that described minor transgressions ranging from falling asleep during work hours 
to annoying management as “serious mistakes” for which an employee may be fired 
without prior disciplinary notice.7  Many of the infractions listed are not defined as gross 
violations under Indonesian law and therefore cannot lawfully be used as the sole basis 
for termination, regardless of the contents of the KKB.  As noted earlier, management 
may not, under the Indonesian labor code, use a KKB to deny protections to workers that 
are mandated by law.  Minor production errors were also treated with excessive severity. 
Many workers believed that management would impose disproportionate punishment on 
one worker for a slight production mistake as a tool to motivate the broader workforce.   
Many workers testified, and document review further indicated, that the 
infractions cited as a basis for termination by factory management were often pretexts for 
the dismissal of workers who complained about working conditions and/or who had 
participated in legal strikes or protests.  As one current employee of the factory stated, 
“They look for small mistakes, for any possible grounds to fire those who speak up.”  The 
Assessment Team identified several cases of workers who were known to management as 
outspoken in their concern about working conditions and who were coerced into 
resigning or fired without legally mandated due process.  These are workers who had 
been involved in strikes and protests and/or who worked on a particular production line 
(Line 5) that had been identified by management (as acknowledged by management to 
the Assessment Team) as a locus of troublemakers.  Given the circumstances of the 
individual cases, and the pattern of violations of associational rights described in the 
                                                 
6 KEP-150/MEN/2000 
7 KKB PT Kolon Langgeng Article 35(14), Jakarta, July 3, 2001 
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previous section of this report, the Assessment Team determined it was reasonable to 
conclude that some cases of unlawful dismissal were a product of management’s desire to 
rid the plant of workers who were prone to speak out and to support labor protests.  At 
the same time, there were also a number of cases of unlawful termination of workers who 
were not active participants in protests or outspoken critics of management policy.  In 
these cases, it appears that a preference for unusually harsh discipline and an arbitrariness 
in its application were causal factors.  It is important to note that, regardless of 
management’s motive for a dismissal, it is illegal to fire workers without due process, to 
fire workers for an infraction that is not considered a gross infraction in Indonesian law, 
or to attempt to coerce workers into resigning.  
Additionally, the Team found that PT Kolon Langgeng management did not 
comply with the provision in Indonesian law that requires management to obtain 
permission from the regional labor committee (P4D) before terminating an employee, 
unless that employee voluntarily accepts the termination and receives a severance 
settlement worth at least as much as the minimum severance due to workers who are laid 
off or terminated (for reasons other than gross misconduct).8  Until permission is granted 
by P4D, or a mutually agreed-upon settlement is reached, the employee is not considered 
“terminated” but rather “on probation” and the employer is obligated to continue paying 
the worker his or her normal salary.9  In order to circumvent these requirements, PT 
Kolon Langgeng management attempted in a number of cases to coerce workers into 
resigning.  Indonesian law distinguishes between workers who resign – who are not 
entitled to severance – and workers who “accept termination,” to whom management 
must pay severance in exchange for the worker’s willingness to forego any challenge to 
their dismissal.  Thus, by compelling workers to resign, PT Kolon Langgeng could avoid 
legal procedures and the obligation to pay severance.  As the individual cases described 
below indicate, the factory on a number of occasions used threats and intimidation in an 
effort to compel workers to sign resignation letters (often blank letters, so that 
management could fill in whatever description of the circumstances it preferred).  
Workers were confronted by security personnel, held at the factory security post, and 
threatened with police action.   
The Assessment Team found that, while the factory did not want to go through 
the process of requesting permission from P4D before dismissing workers, management 
did turn to P4D or to Disnaker in order to avoid or delay awarding severance to workers 
who refused to resign and had to be fired or who were otherwise entitled to severance.  
Under Indonesian law, workers who are fired for cause are entitled to severance (unless 
they have committed a gross violation, as defined in the law).  Yet even in those cases 
where severance was clearly mandated, and where no issues of fact or law were in 
dispute, the documentation, and testimony from workers, demonstrates that PT Kolon 
Langgeng tried to challenge the workers’ right to severance.  This conclusion was further 
corroborated by an official from Disnaker, who told the Assessment Team that in all of 
the disputes involving PT Kolon Langgeng that had come to his attention, the 
circumstances were always very clear on paper, but the company nevertheless contested 
the workers’ severance claims.  It appears that the company’s strategy was to wear down 
                                                 
8 KEP-150/ MEN/2000 Article 2(1) and 22 
9 KEP-150/MEN/2000 
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the will of workers to the point where, badly in need of money, they would settle for 
substantially less severance than they were entitled to by law.  
The Assessment Team heard from multiple sources about a worker, described as 
“outspoken” and “bold,” who was fired when she, along with many other workers, briefly 
interrupted a production meeting by shouting the name of a manager who was walking by 
the production line.  Management challenged her severance claim.  After mediation, 
Disnaker and P4D decided that she should receive 20 million Rupiah in severance 
($2,400 U.S.).  The company continued to challenge the claim and, after a long battle, the 
worker finally accepted 6 million Rupiah, 30% of the amount to which she was legally 
entitled. Other former employees of PT Kolon Langgeng recounted similar incidents to 
the Assessment Team.  One attested that a manager had told her that even if the labor 
court ordered them to reinstate her, the company would appeal the decision all the way to 
the Supreme Court, if necessary. The 1996 case of a fired union leader, whose severance 
claim the company challenged until they finally lost in the Supreme Court, indicates that 
this approach is long-standing.  
 The Assessment Team heard testimony from several workers who agreed to be 
named in this report, hoping that this means of bringing their cases to the attention of the 
factory could help them secure either reinstatement or, in the alternative, the payment of 
severance to which they were entitled by law.  
• Siti Komaria (“Kokom”), a sewing machine operator from production Line 5 
who had worked for PT Kolon Langgeng for two years and seven months, was 
fired in September of 2002; she was eight months pregnant at the time.  The 
factory alleged that she had tried to steal a length of cloth, hiding it under her 
clothes as she left the production building.  Kokom testified that what she had 
taken was a discarded scrap of cloth, removed from a trash can, and that she had 
made no attempt to conceal it, but had held it openly in the palm of her hand 
(based on her belief, she stated, that no one would object to her leaving with a 
small piece of scrap).  She testified that when the security guard informed her that 
workers were not allowed to remove anything from the factory premises, not even 
trash, she immediately gave back the scrap.  Several eyewitnesses corroborated 
Kokom’s account of the incident; no eyewitness corroboration could be found for 
the account of the security guard, on which management claimed to rely.  Kokom 
had been a prominent participant in strikes and protests at the factory, including 
the 2002 strike, which had ended roughly two months before her dismissal.  
Kokom testified that she had received a number of verbal threats and accusatory 
comments from supervisors in the months preceding her dismissal.  She also 
reported facing consistent low-level harassment, ranging from denial of the 
annual leave to which she was entitled, to the blanket refusal to allow her to bring 
any food into the factory, even though she was pregnant and in particular need of 
regular nourishment.  Kokom’s testimony on these points was corroborated by 
multiple witnesses.  On September 4, the day after the incident, upon trying to 
enter the factory for work as normal, Kokom was detained at the security post.  
She was forced to stand on her feet for several hours, which she found both 
humiliating and, given the advanced state of her pregnancy, extremely 
uncomfortable. She was also threatened with arrest if she did not sign a blank 
resignation letter.  Ultimately, she agreed to sign.  She was paid her salary for the 
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period of her maternity leave, including her tunjangan hari raya (holiday bonus), 
but she did not receive any severance pay or a surat pengalaman kerja (letter of 
experience), which is almost a prerequisite for obtaining employment elsewhere 
(though she subsequently called and visited the factory to ask for it).  Kokom told 
the Assessment Team that she wanted to be reinstated at PT Kolon Langgeng.  
• On September 28, 2002 Roslan, a sewing machine operator – also from Line 5 
and also a prominent participant in the June 2002 strike – clocked in for a friend 
who had told her that he was going to be arriving at work just before the bell rang, 
and that he did not want to have a confrontation with security guards. (Several 
workers stated that anyone who arrives less than ten minutes before the bell rings 
for the start of the workday is guaranteed a confrontation with plant security). 
When the personnel manager discovered what she had done, he initially asked her 
to resign, then agreed to issue her a third warning letter instead, as a compromise.  
This meant that if she violated any other regulation during the following six 
months, she could be terminated. Roslan accepted the letter and signed it. After 
two more days, and without any other infraction or incident, the personnel 
manager called Roslan into his office and asked her to sign a letter of resignation.  
After lengthy confrontation with the personnel manager, she refused to sign the 
letter and was fired.  Roslan had worked at PT Kolon Langgeng for two years.  
Clocking in for another worker is clearly an infraction of factory rules and 
merited discipline.  However, the law is clear that if a worker receives a third 
warning letter, he or she may not be fired for cause until and unless another 
infraction is committed.  Roslan was not provided with severance pay, to which 
she was entitled.  She was escorted bodily out of the factory by security.  Roslan 
subsequently sought mediation from Disnaker.  Factory management failed to 
appear at two scheduled mediation sessions, on November 11 and November 15.  
The personnel manager appeared at a third session on November 22.  On 
December 20, Disnaker concluded that Roslan should be rehired by PT Kolon 
Langgeng, noting first her error was not the kind of “serious mistake” that 
warranted dismissal in and of itself, and that, because she had engaged in no 
further misconduct after her warning letter, the dismissal could not be justified.10  
Rather than reinstate Roslan, management chose to appeal the decision to P4D.  
Roslan informed the Assessment Team that she desired reinstatement. 
• In late July of 2002, Sukarni, a three-year employee at PT Kolon Langgeng, was 
stopped by a security guard when she tried to leave the factory with what she 
described as a half-finished skirt removed from a trash box.  After the item was 
confiscated, the chief of security permitted Sukarni to leave without further 
incident.  The next morning, however, Sukarni was stopped outside the gates of 
the factory and interrogated by the personnel manager and two security guards, 
including the chief of security. She was informed that upper management had 
demanded that she resign and she was presented with a standard resignation letter 
and pressured to sign it. When she told the personnel manager he would have to 
fire her, he reportedly threatened: “Don’t try to make any problems. If you keep 
complaining, we will take you to the police because you’re a thief.”  In response 
                                                 
10 Disnaker Jakarta Utara Anjuran 866-11-838; Jakarta December 20, 2002 
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to this threat, Sukarni agreed to sign the letter of resignation.  She did not receive 
severance payments (and had been informed, falsely, by management that she 
would have had to have worked five years at the factory in order to be eligible for 
severance whether she resigned or was fired).  As with Roslan’s case, it was 
reasonable for the factory to cite Sukarni for an infraction.  It is debatable whether 
the incident was grounds for dismissal, particularly in light of the fact that the 
item taken had been discarded and was of no value to the factory.  However, 
regardless of the justification for discipline, by coercing her into resigning, 
instead of terminating her, the factory violated Sukarni’s rights under Indonesian 
law.  As an employee who was terminated against her will, similar to Kokom and 
Roslan, she was entitled to receive 100% of her wages as probationary wages for 
the first six months of the interim period before her case was resolved. 
• Hermanto and Supriyanto, two employees from the packing division, were fired 
on August 9, 2002 for sleeping at work.  Management informed them that 
termination was warranted, citing the clause in PT Kolon Langgeng’s contract 
that classifies being asleep on the job as a “serious mistake” that justifies 
termination without the benefit of prior warning.11  The employees appealed to 
Disnaker, arguing that they were sleeping during break time because they were ill, 
and they had never been given a warning letter or punishment of any kind prior to 
this incident.12  In its opinion on the case, Disnaker noted that sleeping during 
work hours is not a “serious mistake” under Indonesian law,13 and merits only a 
warning.  Disnaker added that, regardless of the contract clause, the standard 
defined by law must hold, and “the employees should be paid their proper 
severance, service/merit pay, and [should be] reimbursed for any medical 
expenses.”14  The company appealed the recommendation to the P4D, and, while 
the matter was pending, urged their former employees to accept a settlement for a 
much smaller amount.  
During an interview with management on February 24, the Assessment Team 
raised the cases of these five workers.  The company refused to discuss Kokom or 
Sukarni, beyond repeating that they considered the alleged infractions to be serious and 
worthy of termination and would not address the question of whether these workers had 
been afforded due process, as required by law.  Management was also unwilling to 
discuss the facts of Roslan’s case, beyond noting that, regardless of Disnaker’s decision, 
the company was entitled to fire Roslan on the basis of her actions.  The position of PT 
Kolon Langgeng management was: “While what she did may not be a big problem 
according to the law, it is a big problem for us.”  When the Assessment Team asked 
whether Roslan was receiving her probationary pay, as required by law, or her severance, 
management noted that they would pay only if they lost the case, and not until then.  
With respect to Hermanto and Supriyanto, the two workers from packing, management 
cited the KKB’s classification of sleeping at work as a “serious mistake” worthy of 
dismissal, as noted above.   
                                                 
11 KKB PT. Kolon Langgeng Article 35 point 14 
12 Anjuran 683/1-838, Jakarta, October 21, 2002 
13 KEP-150/MEN/2000 Article 18(5) 
14 Disnaker Jakarta Utara Ajuran 683/1-838, Jakarta October 21, 2002 
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As the meeting between the WRC and PT Kolon Langgeng was taking place, the 
company was in the process of firing four of its eight mechanics.  These workers had 
requested a raise, which had been denied, and had just returned to work after engaging in 
a two-day work stoppage. (The factory had announced mandatory overtime, requiring all 
employees to work on the weekend, and the four mechanics had refused).  Discontent 
within the mechanics division arose in part due to their realization that their salary was 
50,000 Rupiah to 100,000 Rupiah ($6 - $12) less per month than other mechanics in the 
KBN with a similar amount of experience, and in part from the fact that, as bulanan 
(“monthly-paid” employees) they received a lump payment every month with no 
adjustment for overtime, no matter how many hours of overtime they worked. The 
mechanics alleged that they worked an average of two to five hours of overtime a day and 
that about once a month they would have to work until 2:00 a.m. in order to finish a 
shipment on time. On February 24, when the four mechanics returned to the factory, they 
were detained at the security desk and were informed by the personnel manager that the 
company had decided to fire them. They were offered half the severance to which they 
were entitled, and were pressured to accept it by the “chairman” of the SPSI union. They 
signed their termination papers and left the premises.  The WRC did not pursue the case 




The WRC recommended that, at the level of general policy, the company must 
adhere to Indonesian law in terms of firing practices, rather than the rules as contained in 
the KKB, both because it is public law, not employment contracts, which takes 
precedence and because of the lack of the legitimacy of the KKB itself.  In terms of 
individual cases, the WRC informed the company that, as workers with legitimate claims 
of unfair dismissal, all five had a right be offered the option of reinstatement at their 
previous salary, with back probationary wages as appropriate.15  Workers who declined 
an offer of reinstatement would be entitled to receive a letter of termination, full 
severance pay (regardless of whether or not they had previously accepted a smaller 
amount), holiday bonus pay, and any other entitlements available under Indonesian law.  
It should be noted here that, in urging factory management to reinstate workers as 
required by Indonesian law, the WRC was acting in support of compliance with domestic 
laws and regulations, rather than seeking to impose a foreign standard.  The dismissals in 
question constituted violations of university codes of conduct because university codes 
require that suppliers obey domestic law.  Officials charged with enforcing employment 
law in Indonesia expressed strong support for this use of codes of conduct.  An official 
from Disnaker told the WRC that it was essential for private entities to put their weight 
behind the law as a means of swifter, surer enforcement, because there was a dearth of 
effective state enforcement mechanisms to do so.  
Disnaker uses a non-adversarial process of alternative dispute resolution, 
producing recommendations rather than legally binding decisions with sanctions for non- 
compliance. However, parties that do not wish to accept Disnaker’s recommendations 
must appeal them to P4D, and from there to higher courts if necessary. Parties seeking 
                                                 
15 KEP-150/MEN/2000 Article 16 and 17 state that employees are eligible for 75-100% of their wages 
while they are on “probation,” or while the decision over their termination is pending approval from P4D 
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enforcement of a Disnaker decision may also approach P4D; P4D will take the opinion of 
Disnaker as persuasive, not conclusive, in making its own findings. As the official from 
Disnaker asserted, and the Assessment Team’s review of the legal documents verified, in 
terms of factories’ appeals to P4D, these are routinely made in spite of having no legal 
merit, simply as a tactic of delay. An official of P4D who spoke with the Assessment 
Team confirmed the group’s belief that companies frequently drag out labor disputes in 
the courts, even when the issues before the court are ones that have clearly been settled 
through previous judicial opinions, or through decrees of Depnakertrans. The official 
further asserted that, given the very limited capacity of the court and the heavy backlog of 
cases, private resolutions of disputes was formally encouraged.  
  
Response from PT Kolon Langgeng and Licensee and Status of Remediation 
Following the company’s receipt of the WRC’s summary of findings and 
recommendations on April 1, and subsequent intervention by Nike, PT Kolon Langgeng 
shifted its position on several of these cases.  On April 16, Hermanto and Supriyanto 
received their severance payments as recommended by Disnaker, though they were not 
given probationary wages for the period of the dispute, or the holiday bonus to which 
they were entitled.16  Management informed the WRC that it recognized the illegality of 
firing workers for sleeping during work hours and expressed a commitment to refrain for 
using this infraction as grounds for dismissal in the future.  The company indicated that it 
would not seek to include language describing such conduct as a “serious mistake” in any 
future KKBs. 
At the urging of the WRC and Nike, the company agreed to reinstate Roslan.  The 
President Director of the factory, K.J. Lee, wrote her a letter in June offering 
reinstatement and Roslan came back to work on July 1, with no loss of seniority or 
employment status.  Roslan was also entitled to her accrued holiday bonus and 75% of 
her base wage for the first six months of the time she was on probation.17  The factory 
paid Roslan the money owed.  This was a very positive resolution, for which both Nike 
and PT Kolon Langgeng deserve credit. 
PT Kolon Langgeng was, for several months, unwilling to consider reinstatement 
for Kokom.  At the WRC’s urging, Nike’s Indonesia compliance team interviewed a 
number of eyewitnesses to the incident that led to Kokom’s dismissal.  Subsequent to 
these interviews, in a communication on September 19, Nike informed the WRC that it 
considered reinstatement to be appropriate in Kokom’s case.  Managers at PT Kolon 
Langgeng’s parent company in Seoul and the President Director of the factory agreed in a 
meeting on October 2 to reinstate Kokom and contacted her to inform her of this 
decision.  By mutual agreement, Kokom will return to work on October 15.  The WRC 
reminded all parties that Kokom is due back wages, in the amount of 100% of her base 
wage for six months,18 because her resignation was coerced and because she would have 
been entitled to these probationary wages had she been lawfully terminated.  She is also 
                                                 
16 Persetujuhan Bersama (Mutual Agreement) between Hermanto and PT Kolon Langgeng; Surat 
Pernyataan (Clarifying Letter) regarding Supriyanto. Jakarta, April 16, 2003 
17 Roslan was entitled to receive 100% of her base salary for the first six months of this period, known as 
probation, because she had not been legally terminated and had demonstrated her willingness to continue 
working while the dispute was ongoing, but was denied access to the factory. (See KEP-150/Men/2000 
Article 17 (2)) 
18 In accordance with Kep150/MEN/200, Articles 16(a) and 17(2) 
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entitled to return to work at the seniority and wage levels she would have attained by now 
had she not been dismissed.  These issues are under negotiation. 
Assuming it proceeds as planned, Kokom’s reinstatement will be an additional 
major step toward the resolution of the issue of arbitrary dismissals at PT Kolon 
Langgeng. 
The factory has not been willing to consider reinstatement in Sukarni’s case.  
Because Sukarni has found alternative employment, because of other pressing issues at 
the factory, and because Sukarni’s case for reinstatement is not as strong as Kokom’s and 
Roslan’s, the WRC has decided not to pursue this matter further. 
  
Religious Discrimination  
  
Allegations 
It was alleged that PT Kolon Langgeng discriminated against women who chose 
to wear the common Muslim head covering, called the “hijab.”  If true, this allegation 
would have constituted a violation of university code of conduct provisions prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of religion or religious observance. 
  
Findings 
Several employees and former employees of PT Kolon Langgeng testified, in 
interviews early in the assessment, that the company had refused to hire women wearing 
the hijab and was more likely to terminate them at times of low orders.  The WRC 
Assessment Team did not find either testimonial or documentary evidence to corroborate 
this testimony.  Interviews with women workers wearing the hijab led the Team to 
conclude that discrimination, if any had occurred, had been sporadic and had not 
occurred for a year or more.  The Team found that there were no violations of law or 





 It was alleged that the company would not hire men for the production line, on the 
alleged grounds that men would be “more likely to agitate.”  This would have constituted 
a violation of Indonesian law concerning gender discrimination and provisions in 
university codes prohibiting discrimination. 
  
Findings 
Several workers made this allegation in early interviews, but it was not borne out 
by subsequent testimony from current, former and prospective employees.  The 
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Psychological & Physical Abuse 
  
Allegations 
 The WRC investigated allegations that some supervisors subjected workers to 
abusive forms of discipline. 
  
Findings 
The Assessment Team found that workers were severely punished by some 
supervisors, often for minor production errors or for the failure of workers to fulfill 
patently unreasonable production demands, in ways that violate college and university 
code of conduct provisions prohibiting psychological and physical harassment and abuse.  
Mutually corroborative worker testimony described supervisors frequently ripping 
material out of workers’ hands and throwing it in their faces.  Workers described a 
particular supervisor who regularly thumped workers’ foreheads with her forefinger when 
she perceived an error.  In two cases of more egregious abuse, workers described an 
incident in which a production manager pushed a worker’s head against her sewing 
machine in a fit of rage, and another in which a supervisor pushed a worker repeatedly 
across the factory floor while shouting insults at her. 
  
Recommendations  
The WRC recommended that management communicate to all supervisors, line 
leaders, and production managers that physical and psychological harassment for 
production errors is not acceptable.  The WRC also recommended that management 
provide workers with a confidential means to notify senior management of abuses 
occurring on the factory floor.  Finally, the WRC recommended that a clear policy 
against abuse and harassment be posted widely and reviewed with all employees and that 
all supervisors undergo a training regarding appropriate disciplinary procedures, to be 
repeated on a regular basis. 
  
Response from PT Kolon Langgeng and Licensee and Status of Remediation 
Management has reported that a confidential grievance mechanism now exists (a 
complaint box) and that a notice regarding the procedure by which it may be used has 
been posted at the factory.  The WRC has reviewed this posting and is concerned that the 
policy does not specify who will read the complaints or what the follow up procedure 
will be.  Absent clearer information, it is unlikely that most workers will be comfortable 
using this mechanism.  Nor is a complaint box alone a sufficiently robust grievance 
procedure. 
It appears from company documents that a reasonably specific and detailed policy 
regarding abuse and harassment was developed by brands and the factory in mid-2001; 
however, it does not appear that a meaningful attempt has been made thus far to integrate 
the policy into workplace culture through training and education.  While management has 
acknowledged that physical punishment of the type described by workers is 
impermissible, the problem persists.  Prevention requires a systematic effort to train 
supervisors and educate the entire workforce about this issue and management’s 
commitment to address it – a point the WRC reiterated at a meeting with management on 
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October 2.  Management agreed at this meeting to arrange such a training in the near 
future. 
With contract negotiations pending, PT Kolon Langgeng also has an opportunity 
to use the negotiation process to develop a comprehensive, mutually agreeable policy on 
the issue and a firm plan for implementing it.  This is essential. 
  
  
                                                
Access to Health Care 
  
Allegations 
The Assessment Team assessed the claim that PT Kolon Langgeng failed to 
provide adequate health insurance to its workers. 
  
Findings 
 Indonesian law requires companies to provide health insurance to workers and 
their families, either by enrolling workers in the health insurance program provided by 
the government Social Security agency (JAMSOSTEK, henceforth “JPK;” the health 
insurance program is known as “JPK Packet B”19), or by providing workers with an 
alternative that is demonstrably superior to the government program.  The Assessment 
Team found that PT Kolon Langgeng did not provide workers with JPK Packet B nor 
with a superior alternative.  The only health care available to workers through PT Kolon 
Langgeng was provided by the health care clinic operated by the administration of the 
KBN export zone.  However, the services provided by the clinic are vastly inferior to 
those available to workers through JPK, both in terms of accessibility (e.g. workers’ 
family members, who are covered when an employer provides JPK Packet B, have no 
access to the factory clinic) and in terms of scope and quality of care.  Staff from the 
Cakung branch of the KBN Administration reported, for example, that the clinic’s 
complement of three trained doctors must treat an average of more than 200 patients a 
day and is responsible for a total patient population of 70,000 employees.  Thus, the 
Assessment Team concluded that PT Kolon Langgeng was in violation of its legal 
obligations with respect to health insurance.20 
The Assessment Team also found that PT Kolon Langgeng placed unreasonable 
restrictions on patient access to the zone clinic. Workers described having to acquire 
three signatures (that of the line supervisor, the personnel manager, and the production 
manager) before they were allowed out of the factory in order to go to the clinic. Many 
workers believed, based on their experience over a period of years, that the factory 
maintained an unofficial policy that no more than three or four workers were to be 
permitted to leave the factory to go to the clinic on any given day and that access would 
only be granted during the morning hours. Workers seeking access to the clinic outside 
working hours still had to acquire a letter from the personnel manager before the clinic 
would provide services.  
The Assessment Team found that the factory restricted access to follow-up care at 
the zone clinic and referrals to outside specialists.  Clinic staff informed the Assessment 
 
19 PER-05/PEM/1993 Chapter VII lists the services available under JPK 
20 KEP-14/MEN/1993, Article 2 (4) 
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Team that, before recommending further care for a PT Kolon Langgeng worker, they are 
required to secure the permission of the personnel manager at that factory. (While many 
other factories in the KBN also require this, it is by no means the case that all factories 
engage in this practice).  Because workers do not have access to JPK Packet B, the only 
means they have to access any health care beyond the minimal care provided by the zone 
clinic is if factory management grants permission for a referral and covers the cost.21  
Under JPK, every worker receives reimbursement for medical treatment for 
himself/herself, his or her spouse, and up to three children.22  The Assessment Team 
found that in most cases, factory management was not willing to pay the cost of care 
beyond that provided by the clinic. 
First aid facilities at the factory were found to be both inaccessible and 
inadequate. A number of workers described that they would dip their fingers in machine 
oil if they received a minor cut or puncture, rather than fruitlessly seeking iodine and a 
bandage. Several workers testified that they were verbally encouraged to use the machine 
oil in this way by supervisors, after being told that the factory was out of iodine and other 
first aid materials. The first aid boxes were, in any case, locked and under the control of 
the security officers at the factory.  In a related issue, the Team found that management 
tended to be unwilling to make allowances for workers even on the basis of medical 
advice from the zone clinic. For example, a worker who was recovering from typhoid, 
another who had been diagnosed with a gastric problem, and a third who was pregnant, 
had all received letters from the clinic stating that they should be allowed to eat during 
work hours. In spite of this, they were still preventing from doing so. 
The case of one particular worker, Reni, sadly exemplifies the potential 
consequences of management’s failure to provide workers with the health insurance 
coverage mandated by law.  A mechanic at PT Kolon Langgeng for seven years, Reni 
began experiencing severe lower back pain, headaches, and swollen extremities in the 
summer of 2002. She underwent urinalysis in August at the zone clinic, and the diagnosis 
– crystals in her urine and high blood pressure – indicated kidney problems.  However, 
she received neither a follow-up appointment nor a referral for further diagnostic 
procedures. She was given a prescription for vitamins, enzymes and painkillers, and was 
sent back to work. Several further visits to the zone clinic, each at her own initiative, and 
in response to new or recurring symptoms, produced the same prescription. Reni’s story 
is a lengthy one, but the fundamental issue – the fact that she should have been referred 
promptly to a specialist – is plain even at this level of detail. When she finally went to a 
private clinic four months after the symptoms began, she was diagnosed immediately 
with advanced kidney failure, and was told that it was too late for any treatment except 
dialysis, which she could not afford. Even without having a single dialysis treatment, 
Reni’s care outside of the KBN clinic cost her family 15 million Rupiah ($1,800), an 
amount equivalent to 150% of her annual salary at PT Kolon Langgeng. Reni died of 
kidney failure on January 22, 2003, less than two months after her last visit to the zone 
clinic, which had still failed to produce a diagnosis other than hypertension. 
  
                                                 
21 KEP-14/MEN/1993, Article 2 (4) 
22 PER-01/MEN/1998; UU-14/1993 Article 2 (1,3-4); UU-03/1992, Articles 3, 4, and 7; PER-
07/DA/Jakarta/1989 Article 3 (m) 
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Recommendations 
The WRC recommended, in terms of temporary measures, that management 
immediately change the policy regarding access to the KBN clinic. The WRC 
recommended that the new policy require one signature, which could be obtained from 
any supervisor, and that there should be no daily limit imposed on the number of PT 
Kolon Langgeng workers permitted to seek medical attention. In terms of care after 
hours, all workers should be provided with a letter, valid for one month, demonstrating 
continued employment at the factory and therefore permitting access to the KBN clinic 
without the need for an additional grant of permission. Furthermore, the WRC 
recommended that the factory make it clear to workers, as well as to the administration of 
the zone clinic, that it would not require additional signatures/ pre-approval for any 
follow-up appointments and/or referrals recommended by the clinic staff. 
Most importantly, as a permanent solution to the problem, the WRC 
recommended that the factory enroll all workers in JPK Packet B.  It should be noted that 
the factory had claimed, during the meeting with the Assessment Team, that all workers 
did receive JPK Packet B, but it was apparent, upon careful review of sample JPK forms, 
that only three of the four JPK packets were provided: life insurance, provident fund, and 
coverage for workplace accidents – but not packet B, which covers general health 
insurance. At this point, management responded that whether or not workers receive JPK 
is dependent, under Indonesian law, on the financial condition of the company. However, 
as noted above, this is not the case: the only exception allowed is for firms employing 
less than ten individuals, or those providing private health insurance better than JPK 
Packet B.23 
The WRC pointed out that the factory’s first aid boxes must remain unlocked and 
should contain a more stable supply of basic over-the-counter medicines, such as iodine, 
bandages, and painkillers. These medicines should not be held in one central location 
behind a security guard, but rather in small kits held by the supervisor of each line. The 
WRC suggested that the factory use trainings and public postings to encourage workers 
to use the first aid facilities, and to prioritize health-related concerns. 
  
Response from PT Kolon Langgeng and Licensee and Status of Remediation 
Management agreed to change its policy concerning permission to leave work to 
visit the zone clinic such that only one “senior staff person’s signature” would be 
required.  The new policy also permitted the doctors at the KBN clinic to refer workers to 
outside specialists without the company’s approval.24 
The factory appears to have maintained this new policy with respect to signatures 
for a time, but in recent weeks, according to reports from workers, managers have 
returned to the practice of requiring three signatures.  In addition, requests to go to the 
clinic after the lunch hour have continued to be denied and workers were never provided 
with a letter of prior permission that would permit them to visit the clinic after hours 
without having to wait until the next morning to secure a signature. The only exception to 
this, permitting bypass of the signature procedure, is for an emergency, and this is not 
                                                 
23 PER-01/MEN/1998; UU-14/1993 Article 2 (1, 3-4); UU-03/1992, Articles 3, 4, 7; UU-03/1992 Article 3 
(1, 2, 4 (1)) 
24 Tata Cara Pengambilan Ijin Sakit (Ketika Karyawan Sedang Bekerja), Jakarta, May 13, 2003 
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sufficient: health care for conditions that do not qualify as medical emergencies should 
not have to be delayed in this manner.   
Management announced its commitment, on May 13, to enrolling all employees 
in JPK Packet B or a superior health insurance plan.  Subsequently, management began 
the process of collecting the necessary paperwork from employees.  The enrollment 
process got off to a slow start due to questions raised by employees regarding the 
application form and additional documentation requested.  Nike and management 
resolved the situation by meeting with worker representatives and explaining the 
enrollment process in greater detail, as well as posting announcements within the factory 
about the documents requests and extending a planned deadline to allow for workers to 
gather some of the forms requested from distant home villages.   
In late August, management decided upon a private health insurance agreement 
with Rumah Sakit Koja, a local hospital, in lieu of JPK Packet B.  The process of 
negotiating a health insurance plan with Rumah Sakit Koja that will provide benefits 
superior to those provided by JPK is now near completion; the company hopes to wrap 
up negotiations by October 10.  As soon as the agreement is signed, workers should be 
able to begin accessing services at Rumah Sakit Kojaassuming.  Assuming management 
follows through, this will constitute an extremely important step toward code compliance 
for PT Kolon Langgeng and an enormous improvement in quality of life for workers and 
their families.   
 With respect to Reni, PT Kolon Langgeng initially responded to the Assessment 
Team’s questions by noting that the matter of reimbursing Reni’s family for her care was 
under review.   Several days later, however, after several discussions among the WRC, 
PT Kolon Langgeng management and Nike, PT Kolon Langgeng provided Reni’s family 
with a lump sum payment of 11.5 million Rupiah ($1,380).   
   
Occupational Health and Safety 
  
Allegations 
The Assessment Team investigated allegations that PT Kolon Langgeng failed to 
provide workers with essential safety equipment. 
  
Findings 
During the walkthrough, the Assessment Team observed many workers operating 
equipment at extremely high temperatures, or with naked blades, without gloves, and 
noticed that the sewing machines had no finger guards. The survey by the Occupational 
Health and Safety team led by HIPERKES (the Indonesian governmental agency for 
workplace health and safety) confirmed, on a subsequent visit, that very few workers 
were wearing personal safety equipment (PSE) such as masks, gloves, earplugs and 
goggles. Other health and safety problems at the factory, identified through worker 
interviews, the visit of the Assessment Team on February 24, and, primarily, the 
assessment by HIPERKES, conducted on March 14, included: 
 
• The absence of an active and registered Occupational Health and Safety 
Committee in place, as required by Indonesian law.25 
                                                 
25 PER-07/DA/1989 Jakarta Article 3 (a and e) 
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• The failure of the factory to provide anywhere for workers to eat their lunch, 
although municipal law in Jakarta requires this of all factories.26  During the walk-
through by the Assessment Team, workers were observed eating their lunch while 
sitting on the ground outside the entrance to the production area, or standing along 
the sides of the factory. The situation was not only uncomfortable but also 
unhygienic, given that the area is close to the factory’s drains and that there are 
insufficient trash cans for workers to dispose of refuse after eating. 
 
• Excessive temperatures (in excess of 32 degrees Celsius) in the sewing, ironing 
and packing areas.27  
 
• Noise levels in the cutting, sewing, eyelet and semprot (spraying) divisions in 
excess of legal limits. 
 
Recommendations 
The WRC recommended several actions to bring the workplace into compliance 
with Indonesian law and college and university codes of conduct:  
 
• The WRC urged the creation of an Occupational Health and Safety Committee, 
composed of workers and management representatives, in accordance with the 
requirements of Indonesian law.28  The same law dictates the basic responsibilities 
of the Committee, including the dissemination of information to the workforce 
about general health and safety issues (such as the importance of complying with 
directives to use PSE while engaged in hazardous operations); the coordination of 
annual health exams; and the organization of fire drills. 
 
• Because the company did not have a clinic, the WRC recommended that PT 
Kolon Langgeng set up a rest area inside the premises where sick workers could 
recuperate, as required by Indonesian law.29  This space could also be used as an 
area for the application of first aid, or for routine health check-ups, which are also 
required by law.30 
 
• The WRC recommended that management provide workers with a place to sit 
during the lunch hour, as required by Indonesian law.31 
 
• The WRC recommended that additional fans be installed in the areas noted above 
in order to reduce the temperature below the legal maximum of 32 degrees 
Celsius.32 
                                                 
26 PER-07/DA/1989 Jakarta Article 3 (d) 
27 Laporan Hasil Uji HIPERKES, PT Kolon Langgeng March 14, 2003 
28 KEP-02/MEN/1970; PER-03/MEN/1970; PER-07/DA/1989 Jakarta Article 3 (a and e) 
29 PER-07/DA/1989 Jakarta Article 3(j) 
30 ER-02/MEN/1980 Article 3 
31 PER-07/DA/1989 Jakarta Article 3(d) 
32 Laporan Hasil Uji HIPERKES, PT Kolon Langgeng March 14, 2003 
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• The WRC also recommended that management take appropriate measures to 
decrease the noise levels in the noted areas.33 
  
Response from PT Kolon Langgeng and Licensee and Status of Remediation 
PT Kolon Langgeng provided the WRC with its Safety and Health Policy, 
prepared in July 2001, but this policy contains few assurances that concrete action will be 
taken to ensure a safe working environment.  More recently, management has informed 
the WRC that an Occupational Health and Safety Committee has been created and will be 
properly registered soon.  PT Kolon Langgeng management has stated that it understands 
the importance of integrating this Committee into the company’s internal health and 
safety programs and has pledged to develop a concrete work place for the Committee in 
the near future.  The WRC hopes the Committee’s work will lead to concrete progress in 
the near term and the WRC will monitor developments in this area. 
It is positive that illustrated warning signs have been posted stating that it is 
mandatory that workers use metal gloves in the cutting division. The factory should 
maintain sufficient supplies of these gloves and should continue to require workers to use 
them.   
PT Kolon Langgeng has begun to provide some benches for workers to sit on 
during lunch, but not enough yet for the entire workforce to sit comfortably and very few 
tables.  It is positive to see some progress on this item, but more tables and benches are 
clearly needed. 
The WRC Assessment Team has not received substantive responses to other 
health and safety recommendations.  This issue has not been a major point of emphasis in 
the WRC’s remediation efforts to date, because workers placed less of a priority on this 
relative to other issues.  However, action is necessary on all of the problems identified by 
the Assessment Team and health and safety issues will be a focus of future discussions 
and remediation work. 
  
Failure to Provide Essential Work Equipment 
  
Allegations 
The Assessment Team investigated the allegation that PT Kolon Langgeng did 
not provide essential tools and materials and equipment repairs in a timely fashion, 
making it necessary for workers to purchase these items for themselves. 
  
Findings 
Several workers stated that they often felt compelled to purchase their own 
scissors, spools, needle threaders, marking chalk, seam rippers and other tools and 
materials, because management was lax about replacing materials and broken or worn out 
tools in a timely manner, and because of their fear of supervisors harassing them for 
carelessness or stealing if they asked for new items.  The Assessment Team did not find 
sufficient corroboration of these claims to warrant a clear finding.  To the extent that the 
problem may exist, the Assessment Team hopes that management and the new majority 
                                                 
33 Laporan Hasil Uji HIPERKES, PT Kolon Langgeng March 14, 2003 
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union, with support from the licensee, will work to improve management procedures in a 
way that will reduce friction and the arbitrary exercise of discipline on the factory floor. 
   
Forced Overtime/Overtime Compensation 
  
Allegations 
The Assessment Team examined allegations that workers were not given the 
option of refusing work beyond the regular workday and regular workweek, and that 
overtime work was improperly compensated. 
  
Findings 
The Assessment Team found that PT Kolon Langgeng’s practices with respect to 
overtime violated both Indonesian law and university code of conduct provisions 
governing hours of work.  There are two practices at issue. First, workers were required 
to work on Sundays or weekday evenings to “compensate” for public holidays (when the 
factory is required to remain closed) or other days when management chose not to engage 
in production. Workers did not receive overtime compensation for this Sunday and 
evening work, which the law requires. Secondly, PT Kolon Langgeng followed the six-
day workweek permitted under Indonesian law, but sometimes remained closed on 
Saturdays when orders are low. These Saturday hours were then “redistributed” as an 
additional one to three hours of work during the regular workweek, and were not treated 
as overtime in terms of wages, though the law requires this for all hours worked on a 
given day in excess of the normal eight-hour workday.34 
In addition to failing to compensate workers properly for this overtime work, PT 
Kolon Langgeng’s overtime practices were illegal because workers were not given the 
option to refuse overtime.  Forced overtime is illegal in Indonesia. 
During the period of the assessment, the Assessment Team had some difficulty 
meeting with workers from PT Kolon Langgeng outside the factory because they were 
working on Sunday, February 23, 2003 without overtime compensation, in “exchange” 
for leave on Tuesday March 4, the Islamic New Year. The company had decided to close 
the factory on both Monday, the day the government of Indonesia had designated as the 
official holiday, and Tuesday, the holiday day according to the Muslim calendar. During 
the meeting with the Assessment Team, management asserted that this instance of 
overtime work, and all other such instances, was completely voluntary, and described the 
mechanism for obtaining worker consent as follows: each line supervisor would discuss 
the possibility of overtime with workers in their production line, and seek their 
agreement. Only those workers who agreed, and signed a sheet indicating their consent, 
would work the extra hours. However, during the factory walkthrough, the Assessment 
Team observed a notice from management to staff announcing that workers in all 
divisions would be required to work on February 23.35  Worker testimony was consistent 
                                                 
34 Work beyond seven hours on a standard workday should be compensated at 1.5 times the base wage for 
the first hour, and twice the base wage for the second and subsequent hours. If the overtime takes place on 
a rest day or holiday, employees should be paid twice the base wage for the first seven hours, three times 
the base wage for the next hour, and four times the base wage for subsequent hours. See KEP-72/MEN-
1984; UU-13/2003 Article 78; UU-01/1951; PP-04/1951; PP-08/1981; KEP-45/RES/ 1983; KEP-
24/M/1983, PER-55/MEN/1953; KEP-199/MEN/1983 
35 Kolon Langgeng Internal Document, Pengumuman No.14-U/Pers/KL/II/03 
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The WRC made the following recommendations for remediation of overtime 
violations: 
 
• The factory is obligated to allow workers the option of declining overtime, on any 
given day, permitting them to notify their immediate supervisor, either verbally or 
in writing, of their decision. This policy must be posted prominently in the factory 
premises and management must make it clear to supervisors that no workers can 
be disciplined or punished for refusing overtime. 
 
• All overtime hours, on a given day or within a workweek, must be compensated at 
overtime rates in accordance with Indonesian law, regardless of whether workers 
receive a day off at a later point in time.36  
  
Response from PT Kolon Langgeng and Licensee and Status of Remediation 
PT Kolon Langgeng management responded to the WRC Assessment Team’s 
findings on overtime by defending its approach. Management’s rationale for these 
overtime practices, as described in the factory’s written overtime policy, is not valid 
under Indonesian law and seems to indicate confusion as to the legal distinction between 
voluntary and mandatory overtime.  The policy states that the factory has permission 
from Disnaker to operate the factory for up to 60 hours a week, with one day’s rest, and 
the implication of the policy’s wording is that any work up to 60 hours a week is 
considered mandatory.  Only for work beyond that will the factory seek the acquiescence 
of workers. The policy states: “for more than 60 hours a week, we will ask workers if 
they want to volunteer for overtime, and will require that they show their voluntary 
approval by signing a form.”37  The factory appears to be confusing permission to operate 
beyond the standard eight-hour workday with permission to violate regulations regarding 
the right of each worker to choose whether or not to work overtime. Forcing workers to 
work beyond 40 hours a week is, regardless of permission from Disnaker, a violation of 
the law.38  Whatever permission PT Kolon Langgeng has from Disnaker concerning 
hours of operation, the factory remains obligated to allow workers to refuse overtime and 
to pay overtime rates to all workers who work extra hours.39  Overtime regulations, 
regarding both wages and hours, are fixed at the level of the national Ministry of 
Manpower, and the regional office, Disnaker, does not have the authority to exempt 
factories from these regulations. 
PT Kolon Langgeng’s other defense of its approach, conveyed to the WRC in an 
interview, was that many other factories engage in the same practices.  It is, of course, a 
                                                 
36 Surat Keputusan Menaker Nomor: Kep.72/Men/84;and UU-13/2003 Article 78, and UU No.1, 1951; and, 
PP No. 4 , 1951; and PP No. 8, 1981; and, Kepres RI No. 45/M/1983; and, Kep. RI No. 24/M/1983; and, 
Peraturan Menteri Perburuhan  No. 55 tahun 195, and, Kepmenaker No. 199/Men/1983 
37 PT Kolon Kebijakan Tentang Lembur Karyawan, Jakarta, April 25, 2003 
38 UU13/2003 Article 78 (1.a.) 
39 KEP-72/MEN/84 
Worker Rights Consortium  Page 27 10/8/2003 
fundamental tenet of code of conduct enforcement that the failure of one or more 
factories to comply with a code provision does not absolve any other factory of its 
obligation to comply.   
 Notwithstanding management’s insistence on the propriety of all of the factory’s 
overtime practices, the problem of failing to pay overtime rates to workers when they 
work on nights or Sundays in “exchange” for days off due to national holidays appears to 
have been corrected.  In recent cases, the proper rates have been paid.  Management has 
also shown a laudable willingness to negotiate the schedule for such work with the GSBI 
union. 




According to recent worker testimony, on July 27, 39 workers were required to 
work for 19 hours (from 7:30 a.m. to 2:00 a.m. the following day). Management did not 
ask for the workers’ consent.  The workers were not given any rest period or food during 
an eight-hour span of time.  When the long shift ended at 2:00 a.m., management failed to 
provide the workers (thirty of whom were women) with transportation home or a stipend 
for transportation, one of several occasions, according to worker testimony, when 
transportation had been denied to workers returning home in the early morning hours 
after performing mandatory overtime.  The workers had great trepidation about having to 
return home at this hour on foot, particularly in view of a widely discussed incident two 
years earlier in which a worker walking home from the factory late at night was attacked 
and killed.  However, workers ultimately had no choice but to walk home.  Some of the 
workers succeeded in getting the assistance of a KBN administration patrol car that 
happened to pass by. 
 Subsequently, the affected workers demanded 50,000 Rupiah ($60) per person in 
compensation for being subjected to this excessive and compulsory overtime shift and for 
management’s failure to provide safe transport home.  The new majority union, GSBI, 
lead negotiations with management over this incident.  Management defended the length 
of the shift and its refusal to provide workers with the option of leaving, and explained its 
failure to provide transportation, by citing the uncertain export schedule from buyers.  
Management claimed that the delivery order came at night when management had 
cancelled the usual transportation rented for employees. The Personnel Manager, 
Hardiyono, stated that this was the first time management had failed to provide legally 
required transportation, a claim contradicted by testimony from numerous workers.  
Management did ultimately acknowledge that transportation should have been provided 
and agreed to pay each worker 30,000 Rupiah. 
 It is positive that management agreed to compensate workers and that this 
problem was resolved through constructive union-management negotiations.  And, in a 
subsequent instance of prolonged overtime, which occurred in September, management 
did provide transportation (though not the meal required by law and not the option to 
decline the overtime).  These modest steps notwithstanding, there is a need for 
fundamental change in overtime policy and practice at the factory.  This is an area where 
PT Kolon Langgeng has not made significant progress on remediation.  The WRC will 
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urge continued efforts by Nike on this issue and considers it essential that the factory 





Employees explained that they are annually asked to fill out paperwork (which 
costs some money to prepare) for tax-deduction purposes; however, they asserted that 
they experienced no change in taxation after filling out the forms. 
 
Findings 
Several workers reported that they were required to fill out, and pay for the 
notarization of, forms containing information about their marital status and dependents, 
supposedly in order for them to receive tax deductions. The same workers complained 
that they had never received such deductions. The Assessment Team concluded that there 
was insufficient information to link workers’ concerns in this area to a potential violation 
of college and university codes of conduct or Indonesian law. The WRC has solicited 
information from PT Kolon Langgeng regarding the purpose of such documentation, but 
has not received this information. 
  
Access to Leave 
  
Allegations 
The Assessment Team investigated claims that the factory routinely denied and/ 
or restricted workers’ access to annual leave, sick leave and menstrual leave. 
Findings 
 On the basis of worker testimony, payroll slips, and personnel records, the 
Assessment Team found that the factory denied or restricted workers’ access to leave in 
three ways, each of which violate Indonesian law.   
 
• 
                                                
In terms of annual leave, the Assessment Team discovered that problems were 
long-standing.  In previous years, workers routinely received 12 days of pay “in 
lieu of” the paid annual leave to which they are entitled under Indonesian law.40  
More recently, workers had been required to take the entire amount of their leave 
when management dictated, most frequently a combination of a few days during 
the year when there were temporary lulls in production and the remainder over 
Lebaran (the period preceding the religious festival of Id-ul-Fitri).  In addition, the 
two official public holidays during the festival (for which workers are supposed to 
receive paid leave) were counted against each workers’ annual leave allotment, 






40 KEP-21/MEN/1954; and, Act. No. 1, 1951 Article 14(1) 
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• 
• 
                                                
Where menstrual leave is concerned, PT Kolon Langgeng was found to be, in 
some ways, in greater compliance with the law than other similarly situated 
factories, because at least all women workers at the factory did receive two days’ 
extra pay in lieu of leave. However, testimony clearly demonstrated that women 
workers were not permitted to exercise the option to take paid leave instead, as 
they are entitled to do under the terms of a law stating that women may choose 
not to work on the first and second days of their menstrual cycle.41  Workers 
returning from maternity leave also complained that pay in lieu of menstrual leave 
did not re-start until five months after the birth of a child, though this policy has 
no scientific basis and management had never given a clear reason for the policy. 
 
The Team also found that the personnel manager frequently used his power to 
deny sick leave to workers who, in his opinion, were insufficiently diligent in 
their work.  Many workers testified that sick leave, with few exceptions, was only 
granted to workers who were visibly ill (for example, vomiting or fainting on the 
job) and that even workers who were visibly ill were also sometimes denied leave. 
  
Recommendations 
The WRC recommended that: 
• Management give workers the full 12 days of annual leave to which they are 
entitled and discontinue its policy of dictating when all employees will take their 
leave at the same time.  Workers should be able to take leave after providing 
reasonable written notice. Permission to take this leave should not be dependent 
on an inquiry into whether the reason for wanting leave is valid, nor should it be 
dependent on current production levels in the factory, or how much time the 
employee has missed from work due to illness or union related issues. 42  
 
• Women workers wishing to take menstrual leave should be permitted to do so and 
be permitted to notify the company verbally or in writing the day before, the same 
day, or the day after taking such leave. As is currently the case at PT Kolon 
Langgeng, workers who decide to work rather than rest for those two days should 
continue to be paid at twice their base wage in lieu of leave. Access to this leave 
should not require either a doctor’s note, or the invasion of privacy that would 
accompany any third party determination of whether or not a worker is 
menstruating. There is no legal requirement for such measures. 
 
• Management should develop and circulate a policy regarding sick leave, based on 
objective criteria and on Indonesian law. The decision about whether or not a 




41 UU-13/2003 Article 81(1) 
42 Government Regulation No. 21, 1954 on Annual Leave for Workers states that the employer should 
“regard the interests of the worker” in deciding when to grant leave (Article 5(1). Furthermore, it is stated 
explicitly that “leave shall be uninterrupted [meaning consecutive days]” and that “there shall be one period 
of leave of at least six uninterrupted days.” (Article 6 (1 and 3)) 
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Response from PT Kolon Langgeng and Licensee and Status of Remediation 
In initial conversations with the Assessment Team, management categorically 
denied that there were any problems with access to leave at the factory, though no 
documentation was supplied at the time to substantiate this claim.  However, on May 14 
the WRC received several newly posted announcements describing policies and 
procedures with respect to annual leave, sick leave, menstrual leave and maternity leave. 
In terms of access to annual leave, management had initially asserted that workers 
had decided “collectively,” through the SPSI union, that annual leave would be timed and 
taken in the manner described above.  Because SPSI was not a legitimate union, this 
rationale is not valid.  However, the company eventually acknowledged that the timing of 
annual leave at PT Kolon Langgeng was largely beyond the control of workers and that it 
was in the interest of the company to retire workers to their homes during times of low 
orders so as to avoid having to pay them later for unused annual leave days. However, 
they also pointed out that most workers wanted to return home during the religious 
holiday of Lebaran, and it was impractical to keep the factory open during those days in 
the interests of the very few who wished to stay and work and take their vacation at a 
later time. The new annual leave policy compromises in a way that appears to satisfy 
most workers, and to comply with law: workers are required to submit their request for 
annual leave to the personnel manager at least ten days in advance, and while 
management is permitted to refuse, it must also cooperate with the employee to set an 
alternative date for the leave that is acceptable to both parties.43 
The company asserted that women workers at the factory could and did take paid 
menstrual leave when they wished to do so. However, management did not provide any 
documentary evidence of this, either during the meeting with the Assessment Team or 
later. The recently posted policy regarding the procedures for accessing menstrual leave 
addresses almost all of the concerns expressed by workers and by the WRC, except the 
issue of when menstrual leave starts again after the delivery of a child. The new policy, as 
recommended, does not mention any requirement for a doctor’s letter or for a physical 
examination, and it allows workers to inform management about their intention to take 
leave prior to or on the day of their absence (in person, by a phone call, or through a 
friend or co-worker).44  However, there have been problems with implementation. One 
worker complained to the WRC that when she had approached the personnel manager to 
claim leave, he had stopped her, stating that he did not believe that she was menstruating 
at the time. She had informed him that she was willing to be checked if necessary, but 
protested that she did not believe that she should be subjected to such an examination.  
Women workers at the factory explained that they should not have to submit to a medical 
exam, or have their privacy violated by the staff of the factory in order to claim menstrual 
leave. Since this incident, PT Kolon Langgeng has stated that it will no longer request 
that workers prove that they are menstruating and that it will monitor more closely those 
supervisors in charge of granting leave. 
Under the new sick leave policy, workers may simply notify a supervisor or a 
manager that they will not be coming in. This can be done through a telephone call or by 
                                                 
43 Tata Cara Pengambilan Cuti Tahunan, Jakarta, May 13, 2003 
44 Tata Cara Pengambilan Ijin Haid, Jakarta, May 13th, 2003 
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asking a friend or co-worker to pass on the message. Upon their return to work, they must 
provide a doctor’s letter.45 
On their face, the new policies address many of the issues at hand, but, in the first 
few months after the policies were announced, relatively few employees exercised their 
right to leave, due either to a lack of implementation or insufficient education and 
training on the new policies.  Education – and for supervisors, clear instruction and 
training – are necessary if employees are to feel free to access the leave due to them by 
law and if supervisors are to understand their obligation to respect the policies.  The 
WRC has been advised that the factory is currently preparing a timeline for the 
completion of an information-sharing process regarding leave.   
  
New Developments 
In June, several women who had recently given notice of their intent to take 
maternity leave were subjected to large, unannounced retroactive menstrual leave 
deductions from their salaries.  Some of the deductions reached as high as 169,600 
Rupiah ($20), roughly one third of a month’s wages.  These deductions were reported to 
workers under an abstruse pay slip line item “Lain-Lain 1” (“Other 1”).   
Only after several concerned workers stepped forward was the deduction 
explained as a retroactive menstrual leave deduction, due to the fact that workers had 
been receiving menstrual leave pay in lieu of leave when they were pregnant.  It was 
reasonable for management to seek reimbursement for such payments under the 
circumstances.  However, management should have notified workers before deducting 
wages, should have devised an appropriate repayment schedule in order to avoid 
subjecting workers to unnecessary economic hardship, and should not have made 
assumptions about how many months individual workers had been pregnant. 
  
Additional Recommendations 
 The WRC recommended that PT Kolon Langgeng management meet with worker 
representatives as quickly as possible to resolve the issues of the economic shock these 
deductions had created in the short term for several employees, as well as to come up 
with a long-term policy that would address the overlapping issues of menstrual leave pay 
and maternity leave. 
  
Response from PT Kolon Langgeng to the Additional Recommendations 
PT Kolon Langgeng management, after discussions with the two unions at the 
factory, decided to reimburse the majority of the money and deduct the amount due over 
multiple pay periods.  The parties also decided to reinstate the prior practice of not 
providing menstrual leave for a number of months after employees return from maternity 
leave, but with clearer timelines for this practice.  PT Kolon Langgeng agreed to clarify 
these issues in the menstrual and maternity leave policies and then re-post the policies. 
  
                                                 
45 Tata Cara Pengambilan Ijin Sakit (Ketika Karyawan Sedang Berada Di Luar Pabrik) Jakarta, May 13, 
2003 






 The WRC addressed allegations that the factory deducted workers’ wages in 
exchange for food and transport benefits. 
  
Findings 
The WRC found that the wages of all employees were being deducted in 
exchange for food benefits, while some employees experienced deductions for the cost of 
transport.  While there is no general obligation under Indonesian law to provide food, the 
cost of food at factories that do provide meals is generally not deducted from workers’ 
pay.  This practice, therefore, conflicts with the prevailing wage provisions in some 
college and university codes of conduct and in Nike’s code of conduct.  With respect to 
transportation, Jakarta law requires that factories provide this to workers, but the law is 
unclear as to whether employees may be charged for this service.46  It is clear, however, 
that companies may not make transportation, and consequent deductions, mandatory.  
(An additional note on food benefits: in cases of extended overtime companies are 
obligated, under national law, to provide a meal, free of cost.47)  
Until January 2002, when the regional minimum wage was increased, workers at 
PT Kolon Langgeng received a free mid-day meal. Following the increase, management 
announced that they would no longer provide free food, and began deducting 1,500 
Rupiah (18 cents) from workers’ daily earnings for the catered lunch.  At the same time, 
while some workers were receiving a transport allowance of 1,800 Rupiah a day, other 
workers, who were using company transport, continued to have between 3,000 and 5,000 
Rupiah deducted from their daily wages (with the amount dependent on the distance they 
traveled).  In many cases, workers sought to have their names removed from the list of 
those using company transport in order to avoid the heavy deductions from their wages, 
but they were not permitted to do so.   
  It should be noted that during the latter half of 2002, transportation benefits at PT 
Kolon Langgeng were governed by a Mutual Agreement entered into by workers and 
management, in settlement of the strike of June 2002.  The workers did not succeed in 
convincing management to make any alteration to the system regarding food benefits; 
however, the transport allowance (for those workers who made their own arrangements 
for transport) was increased.  Workers on the list for company transport were still unable 
to remove themselves from this list and continued to have money deducted from their 
wages.  This agreement expired on December 31, 2002, and at the time of the assessment, 
management had not taken any steps to seek its renegotiation or extension.   
  
                                                 
46 Companies of 29 employees or more in the Jakarta region must provide transportation (PER-07/DA/89/ 
No. 74, 1989 Article 3(g)) 
47 SE-07/MEN/1990. Furthermore, for enterprises employing workers for 9 hours a day and 54 hours a 
week, the employer has an obligation to provide meals of at least 1,400 calories, above the base wage. 
(Ministry of Manpower decision Kep.608/MEN/1989) 
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Recommendation 
 The company’s policies with respect to food and transportation must take, as their 
baseline, the requirements of law.  The WRC reported to management that it therefore 
should consider itself barred from citing negotiations with the SPSI union, or any other 
body, representative or otherwise, as a means of circumventing its legal obligations. The 
WRC recommended that the factory cease taking deductions for food and make 
deductions for transport fully voluntary.   
  
Response from PT Kolon Langgeng and Licensee and Status of Remediation 
 Management has implemented the latter recommendation; deductions for 
transport are now voluntary.  At present, however, management continues to make 
mandatory wage deductions for food.  The WRC urges Nike and PT Kolon Langgeng to 
address this issue.  




The Assessment Team sought to verify allegations that the drinking water 
available at the factory was consistently dirty and undrinkable.  
  
Findings 
The WRC Assessment Team found that the quality of the drinking water in the 
factory’s dispensers was not consistent with the requirements of Indonesian law.48  
During the walkthrough visit, the Assessment Team found that most dispensers were 
empty, and that those that were not contained water that was hot and murky. Water 
samples tested by the Indonesian Department of Health Laboratory, at the request of the 
Health and Safety Team led by HIPERKES, revealed that the factory’s drinking water 
contained elevated levels of organic matter (3.48 mg/l). While this figure was not above 
the legal standard, it was still considered high enough that, according to a lab technician, 
consumption could cause significant distress to workers whose immune systems were 
low or compromised.49 
  
Recommendation 
The WRC recommended that all water should be clean, safe and potable; as one 
means of ensuring this, the Assessment Team suggested that PT Kolon Langgeng use 
standard dispensers for filtered and bottled water, with both hot and cold taps, or create a 
cooling system that would at least bring water temperature down to room temperature 
before it is distributed to employees. 
  
Response from PT Kolon Langgeng and Licensee and Status of Remediation 
Management denied that the water was dirty, and stated that workers would not 
drink it if it was cold because they would not believe that it had been boiled and 
sterilized.  The WRC disagrees with this assessment.  The WRC understands that 
                                                 
48 KEP-07/MEN/1964 Article 8 (5): “Water used for food and drink must fulfill the following conditions: 
[…] the water must not smell and shall be fresh.” 
49 Hasil Pemeriksaan Laboratorium DepKes RI, March 18, 2003 Jakarta 
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management is considering installing new dispensers or creating a cooling system, but 





The Assessment Team initiated inquiries in response to allegations that workers 
were being subjected to body searches that were unnecessarily intrusive and that certain 
individuals were singled out during these searches for particularly degrading treatment. 
  
Findings 
The Assessment Team heard mutually corroborative testimony from numerous 
workers that body searches were often extremely intrusive, sometimes even involving 
security guards looking under and inside clothing, both to ensure that food or weapons 
were not being brought into the factory, and that cloth or clothing were not being taken 
out.  Such searches constitute a per se violation of college and university codes of 
conduct, as a form of harassment.  While the Assessment Team heard testimony that 
certain individuals were being targeted for humiliating and aggressive searches, allegedly 
based either on a security guard’s personal animosity or on orders from the personnel 
manager, this specific allegation could not be confirmed during the investigative process. 
  
Recommendation 
Because workers at PT Kolon Langgeng were willing to accept the practice of 
body searches as long as they did not involve any displacement of clothing or aggressive 
touching, and treated all workers equally, the WRC recommended merely that 
management ensure that body searches were conducted in a less intrusive fashion and 
never as a means to humiliate or punish.  The WRC recommended further that 
management set up a system whereby complaints about particular security guards could 
be received anonymously and investigated.  
  
Response from PT Kolon Langgeng and Licensee and Status of Remediation 
Management has conveyed to the WRC its commitment to end the practice of 
overly intrusive body searches.  The WRC has not yet assessed progress on this issue. 
  
 
 Ongoing Remediation 
PT Kolon Langgeng has made important progress on several fronts.  There are, 
however, several serious issues where progress has been slow or where no action has 
taken place.  Further efforts by Nike, and a firm commitment to continued remediation on 
the part of senior management at PT Kolon Langgeng, is necessary to advance the 
remediation process.  The WRC will continue to monitor remediation at the factory and 
will conduct a follow-up review on key unresolved issues this fall. 
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Appendix 
  
Members of WRC Assessment Team for PT Kolon Langgeng 
  
Trevino Pakasi MD 
Dr Pakasi has an MD in occupational medicine from the University of Indonesia and 
currently teaches occupational medicine at the University’s Faculty of Medicine.  He is 
also a consultant on occupational health and safety issues with the international NGOs 
Mercy Corps and World Vision. The industries where he has engaged in audits include 
cement factories, textile factories and communications operations. Dr Pakasi’s team of 
experts from the Department of Community Medicine included: 
- Nuri Purwito Adi, MBBS 
- Adianto Nugroho, MBBS 
- Ronald E. Pakasi, MD 
- Indah Suci Widyahening, MD, MSc 
 
Vony Reyneta Esq. 
Ms. Reyneta serves as the director of the Jakarta office of Lembaga Bantuan Hukum 
Asosiasi Perempuan Indonesia untuk Keadilan (Indonesian Women's Association for 
Justice; LBH-Apik).  The organization provides legal consultations, counseling and 
representation to women who have experienced injustice, including domestic violence, 
sexual violence, trafficking, and torture. LBH-Apik also provides trainings for women's 
groups, engages in research on gender issues, and undertakes research and 
documentation. Ms. Reyneta’s team from LBH-Apik also included: 
-    Dini Anitasari, Coordinator of Education and Training LBH-Apik 
 
Ecoline Situmorang Esq. 
A lawyer in the Jakarta office of Perhimpunan Bantuan Hukum dan Hak Asasi Manusia 
Indonesia (Indonesian Legal Aid and Human Rights Association; PBHI), Ms. Situmorang 
has served as counsel in several internationally prominent cases in domestic labor law. 




WRC Director of Research and Investigations  
 
Agatha Schmaedick 
WRC Field Director/Southeast Asia 
 
FX Supiarso 
WRC Field Representative/Indonesia 
Supiarso is also former staff member and continuing active volunteer of the Socio-
Cultural and Economic Division at Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia (Legal 
Aid Institute of Indonesia; YLBHI). 
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